Chapter 5

Segment Economics

ASSA reports as one company but runs three businesses with opposite economics. The audited segment note shows the group's operating-profit recovery — from Rp326bn (FY2023) to Rp705bn (FY2024) — is almost entirely a logistics turnaround: the AnterAja segment swung from a Rp148bn operating loss to a Rp216bn profit, about 96% of the improvement, while the asset-heavy rental core's operating profit fell. That core holds roughly 96% of the group's fixed assets and bank debt yet, after its own interest bill, earns close to nothing.

Three pillars, three sets of economics

ASSA's revenue splits across four reported segments that map to its three pillars: corporate vehicle rental (lease, drivers, autopool, share-cars); logistics (AnterAja last-mile plus CargoShare B2B transport); and a used-vehicle ecosystem of used-car sales and vehicle auctions, run through separately-listed Autopedia (ASLC). By external revenue the group is now split almost evenly between mobility, logistics and the used-vehicle business.

Source: FY2024 audited consolidated financial statements, Note 34 Segment Information [1]; FY2023 comparatives [2].

Rental revenue is the most stable line — Rp1,849bn (FY2023) to Rp1,903bn (FY2024) [3] — reflecting multi-year corporate contracts. Logistics is now the largest external-revenue segment at Rp1,921bn [4]. The AnterAja express boom-and-bust already covered how that top line whipsawed; what the segment note adds is the profit picture behind it.

The recovery is a logistics turnaround, not a broad margin lift

The group's headline story is margin expansion. At segment level, that expansion is concentrated in one business. Between FY2023 and FY2024 logistics operating profit moved from minus Rp148bn to plus Rp216bn — a Rp365bn swing that accounts for 96% of the Rp379bn rise in group operating profit [5]. Over the same year the rental core's operating profit declined, from Rp333bn to Rp278bn [6].

Source: FY2024 audited financial statements, Note 34 [7]; FY2023 comparatives [8].

The 2025 interims extend the pattern. For the nine months to September 2025, logistics operating profit reached Rp365bn — now the single largest segment, ahead of rental's Rp247bn — while used-vehicle sales (Rp144bn) and auction (Rp61bn) held their contribution [9]. The used-vehicle ecosystem (sales plus auction) is the quiet second engine: combined operating profit of roughly Rp205bn over nine months, on almost no fixed assets. So the earnings that re-rate the stock come from two asset-light businesses — a logistics recovery and the used-vehicle ecosystem — not from the rental fleet that defines ASSA's identity.

The capital and the debt sit where the returns don't

Here the two halves of the through-line meet. The rental core carries essentially the entire balance sheet: at September 2025 it held Rp5,176bn of the group's Rp5,407bn allocated fixed assets (95.7%) and Rp4,043bn of its Rp4,198bn bank debt (96.3%) [10]. Logistics runs on Rp61bn of fixed assets and Rp155bn of debt; the used-vehicle and auction businesses on inventory, not fleet. The profit and the capital live in different places.

Source: 9M2025 segment note, Note 34 [11]; ownership from Note 1 subsidiary list [12]. Auction ownership is ASSA's ~71.5% effective interest in JBA (92.2% held through 77.6%-owned Autopedia). 9M2025 figures are nine months.

On its own asset base the rental business earns a low return: operating profit of Rp278bn on Rp5,029bn of fixed assets in FY2024 is a 5.5% operating return; the 9M2025 run-rate is about 6.4% annualised [13]. That is the economics of a financed-fleet operator — the return is a spread over funding cost, not a high margin — and it is exactly why the balance sheet is heavy.

The rental core barely covers its own interest

The segment note reports finance charges only at group level — Rp294bn in FY2024, Rp221bn over 9M2025 [14]. Because 96% of the bank debt sits in rental, an interest bill allocated in proportion to segment borrowings lands almost entirely on that segment. On that illustrative split, rental's FY2024 operating profit of Rp278bn is fully consumed by roughly Rp281bn of allocated interest — essentially breakeven before tax — and over 9M2025 the segment clears its allocated interest by only about Rp34bn [15].

Source: 9M2025 segment note [16]; interest allocation derived from segment bank-debt shares (illustrative — the filing does not allocate finance charges by segment).

The allocation is a modelling convention, not a reported number, and it can be read more kindly: rental interest also funds vehicles that back the secured, laddered debt, the fleet is resellable collateral, and rental operating profit appears to be recovering in 2025 (the 9M run-rate annualises above the FY2024 level). But even on the generous reading, the wholly-owned rental core is a low-return, capital-absorbing business whose contribution to group pre-tax profit is small. The group's pre-tax earnings are generated by the asset-light segments.

The profit engines are only partly owned

The final turn is who owns those engines. ASSA consolidates 100% of each subsidiary's revenue and profit, but its economic stakes differ sharply by segment [17]:

• The rental core (parent plus driver-services arm DMS, 99.8%) is effectively wholly owned.
• Logistics runs through PT Tri Adi Bersama (AnterAja), which ASSA owns just 49.5% — under half — yet consolidates in full [18]. More than half of AnterAja's newly-earned profit belongs to minority co-owners.
• The used-vehicle ecosystem sits under listed subsidiary Autopedia (ASLC, 77.6% owned); the JBA auction house is 92.2% held through Autopedia, an effective ~71.5% ASSA interest [19].

So the businesses generating the profit are the ones ASSA shares with others, while the segment it owns outright is the low-return debt carrier. That is the structural reason minority interests took 29% (Rp140bn) of 9M2025 group profit, the point raised in Financials and Estimates: it is not a rounding artifact but the geography of the group. Applying each segment's ownership to its operating profit, roughly Rp180bn of the Rp365bn logistics result and a slice of the used-vehicle profit accrue outside ASSA's shareholders — so owner-attributable operating profit is materially below the consolidated line the headline P/E is built on.

What would change the read

The bearish reading is that the earnings powering a cheap headline multiple are concentrated in a logistics turnaround of unproven durability and are partly owned by others, while the wholly-owned core barely earns its cost of debt. The bullish counter is equally on the page: the logistics recovery has now held across a full year plus three quarters rather than a single period; the used-vehicle ecosystem is genuinely profitable, asset-light and 77.6% owned; and the rental core's low accounting return partly reflects a financed-fleet model whose interest bill should ease as Bank Indonesia rate cuts flow through the 100%-floating book.

Two lines would decide it, both checkable in future segment notes: logistics operating profit sustaining above roughly Rp400bn a year through a full cycle rather than fading as express-delivery competition intensifies; and rental-segment operating profit inflecting clearly above its allocated interest cost as funding rates fall. Until then, a sum-of-the-parts view — high-return, partly-owned asset-light engines set against a large, wholly-owned, low-return financed fleet — describes the economics more faithfully than a single group multiple.